An incredible article, a very fine understanding and analysis of issues that are ours in the dialogue between psychoanalysis and Buddhism, has been addressed by Marie- Anne Paveau. Ms. Paveau, professor in linguistics at the University Paris XIII, attended the conference of 27 November, she realizes with a depth here that members of the Young & Psy can only learn! In thanking her, because it opens new avenues extend our thinking and lead to future work. Last November I attended a workshop in the original field of psychoanalysis, which proposed to articulate philosophy, Buddhism and psychoanalysis. It was entitled "Beyond my freedom? Psychoanalytic philosophy, meditation (read program and listen interventions). The initiative came from an association of psychoanalysts, "Young & Psy ", founded by Nicolas Inca, a clinical psychologist, who also maintains a blog, Psychology and meditation. This innovative day has enabled the relationship between Buddhism and psychoanalysis, which exists in practice, but without much visibility, appear on the front of the stage and, hopefully, to sow some seeds of interest in contemporary psychoanalytic thinking. Rigidities and dogmatic categorizations that divide up this solid French psychoanalysis and practices in schools often stereotyped (Lacanian, Freudian, Jungian, etc..) Are being "désolidifier" and eventually, hopefully, by dissolve under the leadership of such proposals.
All Roads do not lead to Buddhism
I took that day because these three areas are familiar to me, and their coordination has piqued my curiosity. Philosophy and psychoanalysis are lands that the researcher in social sciences can meet easily, either in its scientific activity, either in his personal journey, so nothing special in this regard. But Buddhism is obviously more rarely in our work, and we just do not like that. For my part, I'm coming from cognitive science, by reading Francisco Varela and theory of enaction. I came to enaction by social cognition in its distributed version, which I'm herself received by my reflection on the processes of speech production, feeling cramped in the context of available theories in the disciplines of speech-text contemporary, and hoping to integrate my work and experiential material reality. So much for my journey. But what connection with Buddhism, will you tell me? I come here.
I took that day because these three areas are familiar to me, and their coordination has piqued my curiosity. Philosophy and psychoanalysis are lands that the researcher in social sciences can meet easily, either in its scientific activity, either in his personal journey, so nothing special in this regard. But Buddhism is obviously more rarely in our work, and we just do not like that. For my part, I'm coming from cognitive science, by reading Francisco Varela and theory of enaction. I came to enaction by social cognition in its distributed version, which I'm herself received by my reflection on the processes of speech production, feeling cramped in the context of available theories in the disciplines of speech-text contemporary, and hoping to integrate my work and experiential material reality. So much for my journey. But what connection with Buddhism, will you tell me? I come here.
Enaction is a stream that comes from Chile, proposed by Varela from his work with Humberto Maturana , biologist and philosopher author's concept of autopoiesis . The autopoiesis means that living systems are autonomous, they produce their own kind performances, manage their operation in their environments and ultimately produce their existence. This position is a challenge to the cognitive internalist (or "paradigm of the computer") that advance rather than representations of the outside world is predetermined and encoded in the human mind works in this connection as a computer, and that we can not know external objects only through representations that in a.
Varela insists particularly on the concept of emergence, he borrows from Buddhist thought: according to him, the representations are not prerequisites, filed in frames (frames ), but emerge are "énactées "As to the agents operating in environments. He says such registration body in the mind, which is a synthesis of the subject prepared with Eleanor Rosch and Evan Thompson as "cognition, far from representing a pre-given world, is the advent spouse a world and a spirit from the history of the various actions being done by a being in the world "(Varela et al. 1993: 35). This "coming spouse" is a reciprocal interaction between our perceptions and ways to move about in the world (our motor) and it is therefore an embodied cognition, that is a development of body awareness and knowledge: "Knowledge does not pre-exist in one place or in a singular form, whenever it is énactée in particular situations. "(Varela et al. 1993: 97). One of the best illustrations that gives rise Varela What knowledge is contained in for Ethics? , where he employs a comparative ethology:
us use one of the best examples of emergent properties: the insect colonies. [...] One thing is particularly striking in the case of the colony of insects: unlike what happens with the brain, we have no difficulty to admit two things: a) the colony is composed of individuals b) there is no center or "me" localized. However, the assembly behaves as a unitary whole and viewed from the outside, it's like a coordinating agency was "virtually" this center. That's what I mean when I talk about a stripped me of me (we could also talk about virtual self): global configuration and coherent emerges through simple local constituents, who seem to have a center, so that there are none, and which is crucial as the level of interaction for the behavior of the whole (Varela 1996: 85-87).
The subject of consciousness by Varela does not sit in a center, whether neural or metaphysics, but lies in our inclusion in the environments of our lives: it is therefore distributed in a spirit world, and not encapsulated in a form of interiority of consciousness.
us use one of the best examples of emergent properties: the insect colonies. [...] One thing is particularly striking in the case of the colony of insects: unlike what happens with the brain, we have no difficulty to admit two things: a) the colony is composed of individuals b) there is no center or "me" localized. However, the assembly behaves as a unitary whole and viewed from the outside, it's like a coordinating agency was "virtually" this center. That's what I mean when I talk about a stripped me of me (we could also talk about virtual self): global configuration and coherent emerges through simple local constituents, who seem to have a center, so that there are none, and which is crucial as the level of interaction for the behavior of the whole (Varela 1996: 85-87).
The subject of consciousness by Varela does not sit in a center, whether neural or metaphysics, but lies in our inclusion in the environments of our lives: it is therefore distributed in a spirit world, and not encapsulated in a form of interiority of consciousness.
A distributed design of the subject and I
The conference "Beyond my freedom? "Got in touch with many of the ideas of self fertility of this type, but from psychoanalysis and Buddhism. Nicolas Inca recalled in the introduction how the currently dominant view of me is a world closed in on itself, with a "massiveness" that comes partly from the Cartesian conception. He also said that Derrida, in 1990, recommended that "do not forget psychoanalysis," for this conception of the self does not end up dominating our references. Jean-Jacques
Tyszler explains in effect at the beginning of the day that even Freud, we find no conception of the self regulatory body or such as synthesis, which is based in our modern conception of identity that pervades social life and politics. He points out that Freud, the ego is a "bric-a-brac," a concept little unstable and formalized. For Lacan reviewer of Freud, this massive and me is not omnipotent, but rather it is an instance of ignorance, the function being moïque carrier paranoia of ordinary matter. I believe his is to fall in the toils of the subject, and therefore give way to alienation, fantasy and instinct. For Lacan, it is impossible that the subject is identical to something that would itself, since the subject is defined as the subject of fantasy. Our identity escapes us, since we are the fantasy of the other, we are what shapes the eyes of others: "The ego is the repository to another. The ego is compared to another. This is consequential, "he says from the first seminar (1953-54: 83). Jean-Jacques Tyszler stresses that the design of Lacan is not without a certain pessimism, because it tends to reduce the human objects of his tyranny, four in number: the breast, feces, voice and eyes. He recalled that "nothing" ("the object-nothing") almost became the fifth object, which would considerably closer Lacanian psychoanalysis of Buddhist thought.
The conference "Beyond my freedom? "Got in touch with many of the ideas of self fertility of this type, but from psychoanalysis and Buddhism. Nicolas Inca recalled in the introduction how the currently dominant view of me is a world closed in on itself, with a "massiveness" that comes partly from the Cartesian conception. He also said that Derrida, in 1990, recommended that "do not forget psychoanalysis," for this conception of the self does not end up dominating our references. Jean-Jacques
Tyszler explains in effect at the beginning of the day that even Freud, we find no conception of the self regulatory body or such as synthesis, which is based in our modern conception of identity that pervades social life and politics. He points out that Freud, the ego is a "bric-a-brac," a concept little unstable and formalized. For Lacan reviewer of Freud, this massive and me is not omnipotent, but rather it is an instance of ignorance, the function being moïque carrier paranoia of ordinary matter. I believe his is to fall in the toils of the subject, and therefore give way to alienation, fantasy and instinct. For Lacan, it is impossible that the subject is identical to something that would itself, since the subject is defined as the subject of fantasy. Our identity escapes us, since we are the fantasy of the other, we are what shapes the eyes of others: "The ego is the repository to another. The ego is compared to another. This is consequential, "he says from the first seminar (1953-54: 83). Jean-Jacques Tyszler stresses that the design of Lacan is not without a certain pessimism, because it tends to reduce the human objects of his tyranny, four in number: the breast, feces, voice and eyes. He recalled that "nothing" ("the object-nothing") almost became the fifth object, which would considerably closer Lacanian psychoanalysis of Buddhist thought.
Jean-Luc Giribone, then taking the word back on that fifth subject aside and reminded me that is exactly defined by Lacan as the object which the subject falls in love, setting up an imaginary relationship with him. The formula is known: "The beloved is in the loving investment, by capturing it Topic operates strictly equivalent to the ego ideal "(1953-54: 201). For Lacan, there is even the structure of madness: the belief in self, believing that it is something and that something has both a life "solid" and importance. Or me, for Buddhism is a form of nothing, the non-self (an extension of this intervention on the blog N. Inca). On this point, there are real analogies between psychoanalysis and Buddhism, especially in the texts of a teacher who inspired that day, Chogyam Trungpa, the main figure of Tantric Buddhism in the 20th century. In practice the Tibetan route, subtitled "Beyond the spiritual materialism," published in 1973, Trungpa formulas that Lacan could have produced twenty years ago:
It is important to see that the crux of any practice Spiritual is out of the bureaucracy of the ego, that is to say, this constant desire qu'al'ego a higher form, more spiritual, more transcendental knowledge, religion, virtue , discrimination, comfort, in short, what makes the object of his special quest. We must get out of spiritual materialism (1973: 24).
A little later, in a chapter entitled "The development of the ego," Trungpa describes how Buddhist literature represents the ego, through the metaphor of the monkey prisoner
We're talking about a monkey trapped in an empty house, a house with five windows pierced representing the five senses. This monkey is curious: he put his head out every window and it keeps jumping here and there worried. It's a monkey captive in an empty house. The house is solid, it is not the jungle where monkeys leaped and swayed to the hanging vines, or trees where he could hear the wind blow tremble and the branches and foliage. All these things have been completely solidified. In fact, the jungle itself became his solid house, his prison. Instead of perching in a tree, our inquisitive monkey has been walled in a solid world, as if a fluid thing, a dramatic waterfall and beautiful, had suddenly frozen. This house jelly, made with color and energy gels, is completely immobile (p. 135-136).
This dish is amazing echoes in the second seminar, The Ego in Freud's theory and technique of psychoanalysis (1954-55). This is probably the most "Buddhist" Lacan's texts, text clearly suggests some strong notions as "decentering of the subject," the "tendency to think we're us," and he says that the unconscious is "the unknown subject of the self" (p. 59): "In the unconscious, the system excluded the ego, the subject speaks" (p. 77). A network of contemporary anti-dualistic proposals: entering the post-humanism
Listening to communications, I was thinking Varela obviously, but also to other affine proposals in other disciplines, which share this distributed design and fluid from the spirit and the self: the ego is in the other, that this otherness is human or nonhuman, and therefore there is accomplished in the mode of distribution, mediation and shift . We live in fact currently a major epistemological shift in the humanities, characterized by the deletion of large binarisms and a reconstruction of thought about the world that no longer passes through the reference to the centers: the thoughts of "centrism" are increasingly challenged and invalidated: anthropocentrism, ethnocentrism, européanocentrisme, egocentrism and logocentrism. We entered the era of post-centeredness. Some examples, in my train of thought:
Listening to communications, I was thinking Varela obviously, but also to other affine proposals in other disciplines, which share this distributed design and fluid from the spirit and the self: the ego is in the other, that this otherness is human or nonhuman, and therefore there is accomplished in the mode of distribution, mediation and shift . We live in fact currently a major epistemological shift in the humanities, characterized by the deletion of large binarisms and a reconstruction of thought about the world that no longer passes through the reference to the centers: the thoughts of "centrism" are increasingly challenged and invalidated: anthropocentrism, ethnocentrism, européanocentrisme, egocentrism and logocentrism. We entered the era of post-centeredness. Some examples, in my train of thought:
- The distributed cognition, launched in the early 1990s by Edwin Hutchins princeps in his study on the flow of intelligence to board a plane (1991), posits that objects around us are psychic agents, and that in a cockpit for example, the information does not circulate only in the dual interaction between the pilot and copilot, but to "distribute" through the measuring instruments.
- The theory of the extended mind Alan Clark and David J. Chalmers, who defend the idea of externality of mind borrows cete channel of distribution and shift: my mind is, partly, not only yours, but also in artifacts and material objects that surround me and which I use.
- Reflections on the identity of Francis Laplantine I just reread the test I, we and others (read a summary ), just reissued by Editions du Pommier is absolutely adequate to Lacanian and Buddhist concepts. Laplantine is very hostile to the two concepts of identity (derived from a conception of meAnd representation that solidify his view of how our draatqiue relative to each other and the world.
- Although the concept is critical in his mind, and although I find his conservative position and déploratoire, the notion of "liquidity" put forward by Zygmunt Bauman, who is an exact counterpart to the "strength" by Laplantine thinking, helps us to think the circulation and post-Cartesian decompartmentalization in Identity in 2004 and the present liquid in 2007.
- But perhaps the position of Axel Honneth who seems the most operative in the humanities, because after a powerful synthesis of the challenged subject in the second half of the 20th century (1993). Honneth proposes the concept of "self-centered," not wishing to abandon completely the subject of non-nil to me, but do not for a return to pre-structuralist conception of a self mastery and full consciousness.
we can see, the traffic is intense among the various paradigms that deal with the question of subject and self in a non-Cartesian: Psychoanalysis, Buddhism and meditation, social cognition, anthropology, philosophy of mind, philosophy morality. It seems no longer possible to adopt an egocentric conception the topic, which would have a perspective on the other and the world. It remains to assume that change in our epistemological disciplines, which in any case in linguistics, discourse as it is, still remains to be done.
References Bauman Z., 2010 [2004] Identity, trans. English Mr. Dennehy, Paris, L'Herne.
Bauman Z., 2007, This liquid. Social fears and obsessions safe, trans. English L. Bury, Paris, Seuil.
A. Clark, D. Chalmers, 1998, "The extended mind", Analysis 58 (1): 10-23.
Honneth A., 2008 [1993], "Self-centered. The consequences of modern criticism on the subject for moral philosophy, moral psychology in , Autonomy, responsibility and practical rationality , Paris, Vrin, 347-364.
E. Hutchins, 1994 [1991], "How the cockpit remembers its speed" (translated as "How a Cockpit Remembers icts Speed"), Sociology of Work 4 : 461-473.
J. Lacan, 1975 [1953-1954], Seminar 1, The writings of Freud techniques, Paris, Editions du Seuil.
J. Lacan, 1978 [1954-1955], Seminar 2. The Ego in Freud's theory and technique of psychoanalysis, Paris, Editions du Seuil.
Laplantine F., 2010 [1999], I , we and others , Paris, The Apple Tree.
C. Trungpa, 1976 [1973] Practice of Tibetan route. Beyond the spiritual materialism, trad. the U.S. by V. Bardet, Paris, Seuil.
F. Varela, E. Thomson E. & Rosch, 1993 [1991] The inclusion body of mind: cognitive science and human experience , trans. V. Havelange, Paris, Seuil.
Varela F., 1996, to know what is ethics? Action, wisdom and cognition , Paris, La Découverte.
Bauman Z., 2007, This liquid. Social fears and obsessions safe, trans. English L. Bury, Paris, Seuil.
A. Clark, D. Chalmers, 1998, "The extended mind", Analysis 58 (1): 10-23.
Honneth A., 2008 [1993], "Self-centered. The consequences of modern criticism on the subject for moral philosophy, moral psychology in , Autonomy, responsibility and practical rationality , Paris, Vrin, 347-364.
E. Hutchins, 1994 [1991], "How the cockpit remembers its speed" (translated as "How a Cockpit Remembers icts Speed"), Sociology of Work 4 : 461-473.
J. Lacan, 1975 [1953-1954], Seminar 1, The writings of Freud techniques, Paris, Editions du Seuil.
J. Lacan, 1978 [1954-1955], Seminar 2. The Ego in Freud's theory and technique of psychoanalysis, Paris, Editions du Seuil.
Laplantine F., 2010 [1999], I , we and others , Paris, The Apple Tree.
C. Trungpa, 1976 [1973] Practice of Tibetan route. Beyond the spiritual materialism, trad. the U.S. by V. Bardet, Paris, Seuil.
F. Varela, E. Thomson E. & Rosch, 1993 [1991] The inclusion body of mind: cognitive science and human experience , trans. V. Havelange, Paris, Seuil.
Varela F., 1996, to know what is ethics? Action, wisdom and cognition , Paris, La Découverte.
photographiques1 Credits. Meditation Labyrinth ", 2007, Nancy McClure, author of the thumbnail on Flickr, Creative Commons license.
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